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IN A GROUNDWATER PUMPING DIFFERENTIAL GAME 
Santiago J. Rubio and Begoña Casino 
ABSTRACT 
In this paper socially optimal and private exploitation of a common property aquifer are 
compared. Open-loop and feedback equilibria in non linear strategies have been computed to 
characterize the  private solution.  The use  of these  two  equilibrium concepts  allows  us  to 
distinguish between cost and strategic externalities. The open-loop solution captures on1l1y the 
cost externality, whereas the feedback solution captures both externalities. The results show that 
strategic behavior increases  the overexploitation of the  aquifer compared to  the open-loop 
solution. However, if the groundwater storage capacity is large, the difference between the 
socialIy optimal and private exploitation, characterized by a feedback equilibrium, is negligible 
and can be ignored for practical purposes. 
Key Words: Groundwater exploitation, Cornmon property  reSOUl'ces,  Strategic externality, 
Differential games, Feedback solution, Nonlinear strategies. 
RESUMEN 
En este trabajo se comparan la explotación privada y socialmente óptima de un acuífero 
de propiedad común. Para caracterizar la solución privada se han calculado los equilibrios 'open-
loop' y 'feedback' en estrategias no lineales. El uso de estos dos conceptos de equilibrio nos ha 
permitido distinguir entre efectos externos estratégicos y de coste. La solución 'open-Ioop' 
captura solamente el efecto externo de los costes mientras que la solución 'feedback' captura 
ambos efectos externos. Los resultados muestran que el comportamiento estratégico aumenta la 
sobreexplotación  del  acuífero  comparado con la solución  'open-loop'.  Sin embargo,  si la 
capacidad de almacenamiento del acuífero es grande, la diferencia entre la explotación privada 
y la socialmente óptima, caracterizada por un  equilibrio 'feedback', es  despreciable y puede 
ignorarse para própositos prácticos. 
Palabras Clave: Explotación de aguas subterráneas, Recursos de propiedad común, Efecto 
externo estratégico, Juegos diferenciales, Solución 'feedback', Estrategias no lineales. 
3 1  Introduction 
Groundwater has always been regarded as a eommon property resouree where 
entry is  restrieted by land ownership and private exploitation is  ineffieient. 
Traditionally, two sourees of ineffieieney have been pointed out: the first one 
is  a pumping cost extemality and the seeond one a  strategic externality.  The 
eost externality appears because the pumping cost in  creases with pumping 
lift, so that withdrawal by one farmer lowers  the water table and increases 
the pumping costs for all farmers operating over the aquifer.  The strategic 
externality arises from the competition among the farmers for appropriating 
groundwater through pumping since  property rights over  the resource are 
not well defined. 
In 1980,  Gisser and Sánchez  presented a  first  estimation of this ineffi-
ciency,  comparing the socially optimal exploitation with private (competi-
tive) exploitation, using data from  the Pecos River Basin, New Mexico.  In 
that papel' the private exploitation of the aquifer is  characteriz~d assuming 
that farmers  are myopic and choose  their rate of extraction to maximize 
their current profits,  whereas the optimal exploitation is  obtained through 
the maximization of the present value of the stream of aggregate profits.  For 
a  model with linear water demand, average extraction cost independent of 
the rate of extraction and lineady decreasing with l'espect to the water table 
level, they found that if the storage capacity of the aquifer is l'elatively large, 
the diffel'ence between the two systems is so small that it can be ignored fol' 
all practical purposes.  This result has been called the Gisser-Sánchez rule by 
5 Nieswiadomy (1985).1 
Since the publication of this paper, a series of empirical works have been 
published, comparing optimal exploitation with competition: see Feinerman 
and Knapp (1983), Nieswiadomy (1985), Worthington, Burt and Brustkern 
(1985), Kim et al.  (1989) and Knapp and Olson (1995).  The main conclusion 
we  can reach TI:om  this literature is  that when it is  assumed that average 
extraction cost de  creases linearly with respect to the water table level  a~ 
in the Gisser and Sánchez model, percentage differences in present value are 
small although nominal differences can be important. However, it seems that 
regulation of groundwater exploitation is unlikely to be beneficial even when 
uncertainty about surface water supply is taken into account, as happens in 
Knapp and Olson's paper.2 
Nevertheless,  at the beginning of the eighties the hypothesis of myopic 
behavior had already been replaced by the hypothesis of rationality in the 
analysis of private exploitation of common  property resources  by authors 
such as Levhal'i and Mirman (1980),  for  the analysis of a  restricted access 
fishel'Y,  and Eswaran and Lewis (1984), fol' a common property nonrenewable 
1Two more papers were published by Gisser at the beginning of the eighties on the 
comparison between the optimal and private exploitation of groundwater,  Gisser (1983) 
and Allen and Gisser (1984).  In this last papel' it is shown that the Gisser-Sánchez rule 
also works for the case of an isoelastic demand function. 
2The optimal exploitation of groundwater under ullcertainty conditions has been re-
cently addressed by Tsur and Graham-Tomasi (1991), Provencher and Burt (1993), Tsur 
and Zemel (1995) and Rubio and Castro (1996). 
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resource.3  This approach was finally adopted by Negri (1989) for the analysis 
of the common property aquifer. In Negri's groundwater pumping differential 
game, open-Ioop and feedback equilibria are compared and it is shown that 
the open-Ioop solution captures only the pumping cost externality whereas 
the feedback solution captures both externalities, the pumping cost external-
ity and the strategic externality, and exacerbates the inefficient exploitation 
of the aquifer compared to the open-Ioop solution.  This paper has two weak 
points:  first,  the existence and uniqueness of the feedback solution are as-
sumed and, second, the comparison between the different solutions, including 
the optimal solution,  is  made in terms of the steady state groundwater re-
serves because the equilibrium pumping paths cannot be explicitly derived 
in his general formulation of the game. 
In Provencher and Burt (1993) optimal and feedback equilibria, computed 
using discrete-time dynamic programming, are compared.  The authors ex-
plore dynamic inefficiencies via Kuhn-Tucker conditions. They conclude that 
concavity of the value function is  a sufficient condition for  strategic behav-
ior to in crease the inefficiency of private groundwater exploitation, and that 
the steady state groundwater reserves attained when firms use decision rules 
stl'ategies are bounded TI:om below by the steady state arising when firms are 
myopic and TI:om aboye by the steady state arising TI:om optimal exploitation. 
In this paper we adapt the model defined by Gisser and Sánchez to study 
3Hartwick (1980), Berck and Perloff (1984) and Van der Ploeg (1987) are other examples 
in the fishery Jiterature and McMillan and Sinn (1984) and Reinganum and Stokey (1985) 
in the nonrenewable resource literature. 
7 the effects of strategic behavior on the efficiency of private groundwater ex-
ploitation. In particular, we investigate whether the Gisser-Sánchez rule still 
holds when it is  assumed that firms are rational and the effects of strategic 
behavior are taken into account.  To do this we follow Negri's approach and 
evaluate the impact of the strategic externality as the difference  between 
the open-loop and feedback solutions of a groundwater pumping differential 
game. 
It has been usual in the differential game literature to resort to linear 
strategies to obtain feedback equilibria (see,  for  instance, Levhari and Mir-
man (1980),  Eswaran and Lewis  (1984),  Reynolds  (1987)  and Fershtman 
and Kamien (1987)).  However, since the publication of Tsutsui and Mino's 
(1990)  paper calculation of nonlinear strategies has become more frequent.4 
Tsutsui and Mino examine,  for  a  differential game of duopolistic competi-
tion with sticky priCE'13,  whether it is  possible to construct a  more efficient 
feedback equilibrium using nonlinear strategies. They conclude that it is not 
possible to construct a feedback equilibrium which supports the cooperative 
01' collusive price, in other words, it is not possible to get a result equivalent 
to the Folk theorem in repeated games.5  Nevertheless, they find that there 
exist feedback equilibria which approach the cooperative solution more than 
4See, in the framework of environmental economics, Dockner and Long (1993),  Wirl 
(1994) and Wirl and Dockner (1995), where nonlinear strategies are used to evaluate the 
benefits of international cooperation in pollution control. 
5To  be precise,  they show that, as the discount rate approaches zero,  there exists a 
steady state feedback equilibrium that asymptotically approaches the steady state coop-
erative 01' collusive price. 
8 
the open-loop equilibrium. 
In the context ofenvironmental economics literature Dockner and Long 
(1993)  have obtained results identical to the ones obtained by Tsutsui and 
Mino for a symmetric differential game of international pollution control with 
two countries,  and Wirl (1994)  and Wirl and Dockner (1995)  have shown 
that cooperation between an energy cartel and a  consumers' government is 
not necessary  to reach the efficient  long-run concentration of 002  in  the 
atmosphere. 
These precedents have led us to compute the feedback equilibria of our 
gl'oundwater pumping differential game resorting to nonlinear strategies, with 
the aim of examining whether strategic behavior plays against the efficiency 
of the solution, as has been established by Negri and Provencher and Burt, 
01' for  the efficiency, as seems to happen in Tsutsui and Mino, Dockner and 
Long and Wirl's papers. 
Our results show that the difference  between  the sociaHy  optimal and 
private exploitation of groundwater,  this last  characterized by a  feedback 
equilibrium, decreases with the stcirage capacity of the aquifer so that if this 
is  large enough the two equilibria are identical for  aH  practical purposes. 
This conclusion confirms the applicability of the Gisser-Sánchez rule.  More-
over,  we find  that strategic behavior plays against the efficiency of private 
exploitation,  supporting Negri's results.  However,  the applicability of the 
Gisser and Sánchez rule reduces the practical scope of this resulto  In other 
words, strategic behavior exacerbates the overexploitation of the aquifer but 
9 if the storage capacity of the aquifer is  relatively large the impact of the 
strategic externality is negligible.6  These results establish that the potential 
benefits coming from the regulation of the resource will be relatively small. 
In the next section we  present our formulation of the differential game 
and we  derive the open-loop Nash equilibrium and the stationary Markov 
feedback equilibrium in the subsequent two sections, respectively.  In Section 
5 we  characterize the stationary Markov feedback equilibrium and compar~ 
it with the open-loop Nash equilibrium and the optimal solution,  and in 
Section 6 we use Gisser and Sánchez (1980) and Nieswiadomy (1985) data to 
compute the different equilibria and thus illustrate quantitatively our results. 
Sorne concluding remarks close the papel'. 
2  The roodel 
In this papel' we adapt the model developed by Gisser and Sanchez (1980) 
to the study of strategic behavior effects on groundwater pumping. 
We assume that demand for irrigation water is a negatively sloped linear 
6The different results concerning the effects of strategic behavior on the efficiency of 
private solution can be explained by the different nature of the existing strategic interde-
pendence in each game.  For duopolistic firms there exists a potential gain associated with 
cooperation, whereas in a  groundwater pumping differential game firms compete for the 
appropriation of a jinite common property resource.  Nevertheless, if the resource and the 




W=g+kP,  k < O  (1) 
where W is pumping and P is the price of  water. We also assume that farmers 
sell their production in competitive markets so that the price of water is equal 
to the value of water marginal product, and moreover that the agricultural 
production function is  constant returns to scale and that factors other than 
water and land are optimized conditional on the rate of water extraction. 
Access to the aquifer is  restricted by land ownership and consequently 
the number of farmers is fixed and finite over time.  In the model all farm-
ers are identical.  This symmetry assumption allows us to resolve the game 
analytically and thus to obtain sorne initial results on the effects of strategic 
behavior on private groundwater pumping.  Moreover, it also makes feasible 
the study of the effects of changes in property structure on private solution 
efficiency.  By symmetry we  can write the aggregate rate of extraction as 
W  =  NWi, where N  is the number of farmers and Wi the rate of extraction 
of the representative farmer.  Then, the individual demand functions are 
1 
Wi = - (g +  kP),  i =  1, ... , N 
N 
and the revenues of the ith farmer 
(2) 
(3) 
The total cost of extraction depends on the quantity of water extracted and 
the depth of the water table 
C(H, W) = (co +  clH)W,  Cl < O,  (4) 
11 where H  is  the water table elevation aboye sea level,  ea  is the maximum 
average cost of extraction and Hm = -ea/el represents the maximum water 
table elevation that we associate with the natural hydrologic equilibrium of 
the aquifer.  Then, as the marginal and average costs do not depend on the 
rate of extraotion, the individual farmer's extraction costs are 
(5) 
Costs vary directly with the pumping rate and inversely with the level of 
the water tableo  Marginal and average costs in crease with the pumping lift 
and are independent of the extraction rateo  We are implicitly assuming that 
changes in the water level are transmitted instantaneously to all users.  This 
assumption clearly exaggerates the degree of common property.  Moreover, 
the symmetry assumption requires that the groundwater basin has parallel 
sideB  with a flat bottom. 
The differential equation which describell the dynamics of the water table 
is obtained as the difference between natural recharge and net extractions 
AS j¡ =  R + (¡ - l)W,  O < 'Y  < 1  (6) 
where R  is  natural recharge,  'Y  is  return flow  coefficient, and AS is area of 
the aquifer times storativity. We assume that the rate of recharge is constant 
and deterministic and, although artificial recharge of the aquifer is feasible in 
this specification, we focus on the case where the resource is being depleted.7 
7See Knapp and Olson  (1995)  for  a  groundwater management model with stochastic 
surface flows and artificial recharge. 
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Finally, we assume that the interactions among the agents aJ.'e  completely 
noncooperative and rational, then the ith farmer faces the following dynamic 
optimization problem: 
(7) 
S.t.  j¡  H(O)  =  Ha  > O 
where r  is  the discount rateo  We implicitly assume the nonnegativity con-
straint on the control  variable and we  do  not  impose H  ~ O as  a  state 
constraint but as a terminal condition:  limt-><XJ H(t) ~  O for simplicity.8 
3  Open-Ioop Nash equilibrium 
In the open-Ioop Nash equilibrium, farmers commit themselves at the mo-
ment of starting to an entire temporal path of water extraction that maxi-
mizes the present value of their stream of profits given the extraction path of 
rival farmers.9  Then for every given path W,i(t)  of farmer j, .1  =  1, ... , N  - 1, 
farmer 'i  faces  the problem of maximizing (7)  given Wj(t).  A  similar prob-
lem faces the other players j. An equilibrium of the game are N  open-loop 
strategies that solve the N  optimization problems simultaneously.  Forming 
the current value Hamiltonian in the standard way, the necessary conditions 
STo simplify the notation, the t argument of the variables has been suppressed. It wil! 
be used only if it is  necessary for an unambiguous notation. 
9For a formal definition of strategy space and equilibrium concepts used in this paper 
see Fershtman and Kamien (1987) and Tsutsui and Mino (1990).  By exteusion they can 
easily be adapted to our game. 
13 for an interior open-loop equilibrium are 
N  g  ')'-1 
kWi - k - (co +  C1H ) +  A  AS  =  O,  í = 1, .", N  (8) 
).i=rAi+C1Wi,  í=l,,,.,N,  (9) 
the transversálity conditions being: 
(10) 
Assuming the marginal extraction cost  of the last unit of water,  Co,  lS 
higher than the maximum value of marginal product, -g/k, (co  ;:::  -g/k) 
eliminates the possibility of a corner solution in which H  :s 0. 10  On the other 
hand, assuming symmetric farmers simplifies the solution.  With symmetry, 
Wi. = Wj = W and Ai = Aj = A and therefore the 2N equations defined by (8) 
and (9)  reduce to 2. 
Differentiating (8) with respect to t and substituting ). and A in (9) yields 
(11) 
IOSee Rubio, Martínez and Castro (1994) for  a complete characterization of all possible 
long-term equilibria (steady states), including the physical exhaustion of water reserves in 
a finite or infinite time.  In fact, the condition for an interior solution given above can be 
relaxed, as it is shown in Rubio, Martínez and Castro (1994),  Prop.  2), since it must be 
also taken into account to define it the steady state user costo  However,  the analysis of 
this issue in the framework of the differential game presented in Section 2 is outside of the 
scope of this papel'. 
14 
Taking into account that at the steady state f¡ =  w =  O, we can use equations 
(6)  and (11) to find the stationary equilibrium, given by 
H!:n =  _-:--R_--:- + _R  _ _  ~  (fL + c-o) 




R  (13) 
(')'-l)N' 
AH this can be summarized as: 
Proposition 1  There exists a unique stationary open-loop Nash equilibrium 
for the garne.  The  water tablc  at this equilibrium is given  by  (12)  and the 
rate of extraction by  (13). 
Observe that in this game as  the dynamics of water table H  does  not 
depend on H, the stationary equilibrium extraction rate is independent of the 
equilibrium concept used to resolve the game.  On the other hand, equation 
(8) implies that at every moment each playerfollows the policy Nw/k-g/k = 
Co + C1H -- A(')' -l)/AS. This rule is the well-known price equal to marginal 
cost, but in this case marginal cost presents two components:  the marginal 
extraction cost and the user cost,  -A(')' - l)/AS.u  At the steady-state, /\ 
is equal to the capitalized value of the in crease in cost resulting from a one-
unit reduction in the water table for an extraction rate equal to its stationary 
value so that the user cost at the steady-state is equal to -c1R/rASN. 
llThe necessary conditions for  optimal groundwater pumping have been established in 
the Iiterature a long time ago.  See Negri  (1989) for  an interpretation of A. 
15 To evaluate the efficiency of this equilibrium we  need the socially opti-
mal or efficient equilibrium.  That equilibrium can easily be obtained as a 
particular case of the open-Ioop Nash equilibl'ium making N  equal to one. 
_---;-R_--:- + _R  _ _  ~  (fL + co) 
kCl(-r -1)  rAS  Cl  k  .  (14) 
Now  we  can compare the stationary values of the water table fol'  the two 
equilibria 
AH* = H~o  - H~L =  A~r (1 - ~) > O.  (15) 
This difference repl'esents the impact of the pumping cost ea;ternality on the 
stational'y value of the water tableo  If  we  now make a  comparative statics 





-~(1-~)  <O 
ASr2  N 
R 
ASrN2 > O. 
These results allow us to present the following proposition: 
Proposition 2  The  socially  optimal  stationary  equilibr'ium  water  table  is 
higher  than  the  stationary open-loop  Nash  equilibrium  water table  and the 
diffcT'ence  declines  as  the  discount  rate incT'eases  or the  number of faT'mers 
decreases. 
The effect a discount rate variation has on the difference between the two 
stationary values is explained by the different impact that a variation of the 
discount rate has on the user cost in each case.  As A;LN = A~o we find that 
18A;d8rl <  18A~o/8rl. Thus an in  crease in the discount rate decreases the 
16 
user cost in  both cases but by a larger amount in the optimal solution,  so 
that, although the two stationary values decrease because of the reduction 
in the usel' cost, the decrease in the optimal value is higher than that in the 
inefficient  value,  resulting in a  decrease of the difference between the two 
steady-states.  On the other hand,  the effect  a  variation in the number of 
farmers has on the difference is clear, if one notices that the socially optimal 
equilibrium is independent of the number of farmers.  Thus an increase in the 
number of farmers reduces the user cost of the l'esource and,  consequentIy, 
the stationary open-Ioop Nash equilibrium water table, causing an increase 
in the difference between the two equilibria. 
Finally,  we  want  to  comment  on  how  these  results  affect  Gisser  and 
Sánchez's conclusions.  The first  thing that we  can point out  is  that our 
l'esults confirm their rule, so that we  predict, like them, that if the storage 
capacity of the aquifer is  relatively large, the two equilibria would be very 
close;  in  fact,  identical for  aH  practical purposes.12  The second remark is 
that Gisser and Sanchez's estimations are overvalued because these authors 
assume that the farmers are myopic.13  However,  if one assumes,  as we  do, 
that the farmers are rational, their private eva.luation of the user cost will 
be positive and price will consequently exceed marginal extraction costs (see 
121n  Sectíon 6 we use the data from  Gisser and Sánchez (1980) to illustrate thís result 
for an open-loop Nash equilibrium. 
13In fact, as the are assuming a constant marginal extractíon cost, they are implícitly us-
íng an equilíbrium concept equivalent to the open access long-run equilibrium for common 
property resources (P =  MC =  AC). 
17 (8)).  With rational farmers the myopic solution applies only asymptotically, 
that is,  when the number of farmers approaches infinity, 
lim  H!:JL  =  H'lrr = 
N->oo 
which implies' that 
where the right-hand side is  equal to the difference  found  by  Gisser  and 
Sánchez  (see Gisser and Sanchez (1980,  p.  641))  in  their model,  which  is 
higher than the difference (15). 
4  Stationary Markov feedback equilibrium 
In an economic environment in which binding commitments are not fe asible 
because of undefined property rights and where all players can have access 
to current information on water table elevation, strategies that depend only 
OIl  time cannot be credible.  As is well known this requiremeIlt of credibility 
is  fulfilled by a stationary Markov feedback equilibrium which is  derived by 
the dynamic programming approach. In Markov feedback equilibria farmers 
adopt decision  rules  that depend OIl  the water table,  taking as  given  the 
decisioIl rules of their rivals. 
In this section we demonstrate, following Tsutsui and Mino (1990)  and 
Dockner and Long (1993), that our groundwater pumping game admits non-
linear Markov feedback  equilibria.  As  Iloted  aboye,  a  stationary Markov 
18 
feedback equilibrium must satisfy the dynamic programming equation 
rVi(H)  = 
(16) 
where i  =  1, ... , N.  Using the maximization condition Vi' (H)  = 
(ASjb- 1))((gjk) +  Co +  C1H - (Nwdk)) and the symmetry assumption we 
have 
rV(H)  [~  w
2 
- (f +  Ca + c1H) w] 
+ (1 ~  1 + NW) (f +  Co +  C1H - ~  w) .  (17) 
Assuming  a  zero  discount  rate,  the  Bellman  equation  (17)  becomes  the 
quadratic equation in w 
with two solutions 
W1,2  =  N(2~-1) {(N  1)(f+co+C1H)- k(~~1) 
± [(N -1) (~+c,  + "H) - k(~~  1))' 
+ 2N~~~  _-l~)R (~  +c, + "H  ) n  (19) 
Based on this result for  r  =  O we  propose a  nonlinear strategy for  the 
case with r > O given by 
19 where f(H) is a nonlinear function in H.  Working with (20) and the Bellman 
equation we  obtain a set of stationary Markov strategies implicitly defined 
by the equation14 
K  =  {w- N(2~-1) [k(N-1)(t+CO+ClH)- b~~)] 
~ (H + ~) yar
I 
{w - N(2~  _  1)  [k(N - 1) (t +  Co + cIH) - b~R1)] 
- ( H + ~)  yb r
2 
(21) 
where K  is an arbitrary constant, and 
F  k(N - l)2ci  N ASclr 
- N(2N-1) +b-1)(2N-1»0  (22) 
G  F (g  )  Nkb -l)Cl - NASr  - -+co  - R<O 
Cl  k  k(2N - l)b·- 1)2  (23) 
!  rAS  ±  rAS  2  4kF  "2  (  { Ir 
2  (7- 1)(2N-l)  [t7-1)(2N-l))  - N(2N-l)] (  ) 
where el =  b
Yu 
u  < O and 1':2 =  -;:yba  < O.  y -y  <"  y -y 
The set of solution curves given by (21)  includes two linear stationary 
Markov strategies corresponding to the case of K  =  O given by 
k(N - 1)  (g)  R  G  a 
N(2N -1)  k +  Co  - b - 1)(2N -1) + F Y 
[
k(N - l)Cl  a] 
+  N(2N -1) +  Y  H  (25) 
b  _  k(N - 1)  (g)  R  G  b 
W  - N(2N - 1)  k +  Co  - b -1)(2N - 1) + F Y 
14The derivation of this equation follows step by step the one presented by Doclmer and 
Long (1993)  and will not be repeated in this papero 
20 
[
k(N - l)Cl  b]  H 
+  N (2N - 1) +  y  .  (26) 
In Fig.  1, we note that each solution curve is only well defined in the region of 
nonnegative marginal value, that is, on the right of the line defined by VI = O, 
and the set of solution curves consists of two straight lines and a family of 
hyperbolic curves.  The two straight lines wa(H)  and wb(H)  correspond to 
the singular solutions (25)  and (26).  The first is positively sloping and the 
second negatively and they go through (f¡, w).  The steep dotted line is the 
locus dw/dH = -00, whereas the dotted line with negative slope is the locus 
dw/dH =  O,  for Eq.  (21). 
V'=o 
w 
dw/dH  =  - 00 











H Each curve in Fig.  1 corresponds to a nonlinear stationary Markov feed-
bade equilibrium and as in  our game the set of solution curves covers the 
entire H  - w  plane we see that for each point on the steady-state line, SSL, 
(defined by w*  =  -R/N(rr - 1)) it is always possible to find some strategy 
satisfying the'stationarity condition: j¡ = O.  However, the existence of a sta-
tionary point does not necessarily mean that there exists a path, H* (t), that 
converges to it.  For that reason we  are interested in  t~e stable stationary. 
points. 
Taking into account that the rate of extraction is given by the nonlinear 
stationary Markov strategies implicitly defined by (21),  the state equation 
(6)  can be written as15 
.  1 
H =  AS [R + (rr - l)Nw(H)]. 
Linearizing this equation around the steady-state gives the stability con  di-
tion:  dw/dH >  O,  that implies that a  stationary water table H*  is  locally 
stable when the slope of w(H) is positive at the intersection point with SSL. 
Graphically this means that set of locally stable stationary points is defined 
by  the interval (HL,HH)  (see  Fig.  1).  The limits of this interval can be 
calculated as the intersection points of the lines Vi  =  O and dw / dH =  O with 
15Remember,  in  arder to avoid  confusion  resulting from  the term stationary in  this 
section, that stationary Markov strategies describe decision  rules that prescribe an ex-
tractian rate as a funetion exclusively of the observed water table, and are, consequently, 





The derivation of HL  is immediate.  To calculate HH  we have to solve for 
f'(  ) = _ k(N - l)Cl 
H  N(2N-1)'  (29) 
which has been obtained from (20)  for dw/dH =  O. 
Substituting (20) into the Bellman equation yields 
1  [  )  NR]2  rV(H)  =  2kN(2N _ 1)  -k(N -1) (t +  Ca + c1H  + 'Y - 1 
R  (g  )  (2N - l)N  2  +  'Y - 1  ¡;; +  Co + c1H  - 2k  f(H)  . 
Differentiating with respect to H and substituting Vi  again using Eq.  (20) 
for w(H) yields 
{ [ 
ASN  ] (g  )  ASN  R 
r  (rr-1)(2N-1)  ¡;;+co+c1H  + (2N-1)k(rr-1)2 
ASN  f(H)} 
k(rr-1) 
(N -l)Cl  [  (g  )  NR] 
(2N -l)N  k(N -1)  ¡;; +  Co + c1H  - 'Y - 1 
+  'YR~\ - (2N ~  l)N  f(H)f'(I-l), 
which upon rewriting results in 
'(  ) _  k  [  ASNr  f(H) _ FH - e] 
f  H  - (2N -l)Nf(H)  k(rr-1)  .  (30) 
23 On the other hand, we know that at the steady-state w* = -R/N(ry - 1), 
then using Eq.  (20) one more time we have 
(H*)  k(N - 1)  (g  H*  R) 
f  =-N(2N-1)  k+
CO +
C1  + (ry-1)k '  (31) 
and we  can use  (29),  (30)  and (31)  to obtain HH. 16  The next proposition 
summarizes these results. 
Proposition 3  Any water table  level in the  interval (HL , HH)  'ís  a locally 
stable  steady-state,  where  H  L  is the  stationary water table  fo'('  the  myopic 
solution and HH is the stationary water table for the open-loop solution. 
In our groundwater pumping game, more can be said about the stability of 
a steady-state. Specifically, we can identify the domain of initial water table 
values from which H*(t)  converges to H*,  the stationary point.  But first, we 
need to introduce more notation.  As  we  have already pointed out, the set 
of solution curves consists of two straight lines and a  family of hyperbolic 
curves.  This family is divided into six types.  Let gn(H) be a solution curve of 
type n and en the set of gn(H)  (n = 1, ... ,6) (see Fig.  2).  Each en contains 
an  uncountable number of hyperbolic  curves.  From Fig.  2 and equation 
(21),  it is  clear that each gn(H)  E  en including the linear ones, n  =  a, b, 
is  well defined and continuously differentiable on the domain Dn ==  [~n, :En], 
16 As HL  < HH  the 88L must be below the intersection point of linear strategies in Fig. 
1. If  88L were above (fI, w)  then HL  > HH  since HL  is defined by the intersection point 
of the dw/dH = -00 line with 88L, and HH  is defined by the intersection point of the 
dw/dH = O Une with 88L, 
24 
where xnrepresents the lower bound of the domain and :En  the upper bound. 
Let B (H*)  denote a reachable initial water table set for  H*.  To find B (H*) 
we use the fact that at any point aboye (below)  SSL in the H  - w  plane, 
dH/dt  <  (»  O.  Hence,  for  some  Ho,  if the point (Ho,gn(Ho))  is  aboye 






_- dw/dH  = - 00 
25 Now we consider four  cases for  H*,  (i)  If H*  =  HH,  the corresponding 
gH(H)  is  tangent to SSL at HH  and defined on DH =  [:.:H,XH].  It is easily 
checked graphicallythat B(HH) =  [xH, HH]  e DH. In this case the difference 
- 01-
between the dornain of the strategy and the B set is dearly seen.  (ii) If  H*  E 
(Ha, HH),  there-exists sorne g4(H)  E  G4  which supports H*  (see  Fig.  2). 
g4(H)  is  defined on the H*-dependent dornain D(H*) =  [::4  (H*), x4(H*)]. 
>  Frorn the hyperbolic property of g4( H),  it can be :;;een  that there exists. 
H4(H*)  E  D(H*) such that H4(H*)  > H*  and g4(H)  intersects SSL again 
at H4(H*).  So that B(H*) =  [:.:4  (H*), H4(H*)]  ~  D(H*).(iii) If H*  =  Ha, 
the corresponding ga(H)  is  defined  on  Da  =  [:.:a, Hm],  where  Hm  is  the 
water table level associated with the rnaxirnurn capacity 01.' natural hydrologic 
equilibriurn of the aquifer.  For each Ho  E Da,  H*(t)  converges to Ha.  Thus, 
B(Ha)  =  Da.  (iv)  If H*  E  (HL , Ha),  there exists sorne g5(H)  E  G5  which 
supports H*  (see  Fig.  2).  g5(H)  is  defined on the H*-dependent dornain 
D(H*)  =  [:.:5  (H*), x
5(H*)].  For each Ho  E  D(H*),  H*(t)  converges to H*. 
Hence B(H*)  =  D(H*).  These relationships are surnrnarized in the next 
proposition. 
Proposition 4  (a) B(H*') e B(H*) for any H*,H*'  8uch that Ha < H*  < 
H*'  S  HH.  (b)  B(H*)  --t  [:.:a, Hb],  as  H*  --t Ha  frorn  above.  (e)  B(H*)  --t 
[::a, H],  as H*  --t Ha  fTorn  below. 
(a)  shows that if there are two stationary water tables H*  ancl  H*'  with 
H*  < H*',  then the clornain  of the reachable initial water table for  H*'  is 
srnaller  than the one for  H*,  Whereas (b)  ancl  (e)  irnply  that B(H*)  lS 
26 
discontinuous at H*  =  Ha,  since B(H*) is a set-valued function. 
To condude this section we show that the aboye constructed stationary 
Markov strategies define a stationary Markov feedback equilibriurn. 
Proposition 5  For each w(H)  given by  (21)  the function J(H)  defined by 
J(H)  =  ~ [-N(2~k  -1)  W(H)2 + ((N -1) (t +  Co + CIH) 
-k(~~l))W(H)+  í'~1 (t+CO+CIH)]  (32) 
is a twice differentiable value funetion that generates stationary Markov feed-
back equilibria that support any stationary point, H*,  in the interval (H  L, H  H  ), 
if Ho  E  B(H*). 
Proof.  See Appendix. 
One irnportant characteristic of this result is the nonuniqueness of the 
stationary Markov feedback equilibriurn.  In this case we find that not only a 
stationary water table H*  is incleterrninate but for a given initial value of the 
water table, different stationary Markov feedback equilibria can be reachecl. 
So  it looks interesting to wonder which equilibrium is the rnost efficient  01.' 
generates the highest payoff.17 
J 7See Tsutsui and Mino (1990, p.  153)  for an explanation of the indeterminacy of the 
solution. From a mathematical point of view this is caused by the incomplete transversality 
condition. 
27 5  Characterization of stationary Markov 
feedback equilibrium 
As we have established in Proposition 5 the stationary Markov feedback equi-
libria in the intei'Val (HL , HH)  that can be supported by a stationary Markov 
strategy depend on the initial water table level.  In this papel' we assume that 
the initial water table level is equal to its natural hydrologic eq'uilibrium,  cor~ 
responding to the maximum water table elevation at which the water reserves 
coincide with the storage capacity of the aquifer, and that the human activ-
ity, justified by economic parameters, consists of mining the aquifer until an 
economic hydrologic  equilibrium has been reached.  The difference between 
the two equilibria is that the first depends exclusively on hydrologic parame-
ters whereas the second is explained by hydrologic and economic parameters. 
This assumption has a  clear consequence:  the socially optimal equilibrium 
water table,  H~o, will be lower than the initial water table, Ho, and conse-
quently we can establish the following relationship:  HH  < H~o < Ho, since 
HH,  defined by (28), is lower than H~o, defined by (14).18 
Now we can say more about the possible equilibria that can be reached 
18Notice that if we  assume that the initial value is  lower  than the optimal stationary 
equilibrium water table and, consequently, lower than the natural hydrologic equilibrium, 
this means that there existed a previous phase of resource exploitation from  the natural 
hydrologic  equilibrium whose steady-state value  would  now  be the initial value we are 
assuming in our model.  In this papel' we  focus exclusively  011  the mining of the aquifer 
and we do not cOlIsider this case. 
28 
through a stationary Markov strategy.  Specifically, we can identify the locally 
stable equilibria that can reached from the initial water table value.  Let 
E(Ho) denote a stable stationary point set reachable from Ho.  To find E(Ho) 
we  use the fact that any point aboye SSL in the H  - w plane, dHjdt <  O. 
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29 Now we consider two cases for  Ho.  (i) If  Ho  2=:  Hb, the only strategy that 
leads to a stable stationary point is the linear one, ga(H) and then E(Ho) = 
[Ha],  that is,  the only stationary water table that can be supported as  a 
stationary Markov feedback equilibrium is Ha.  (ii) If  Ho  < Hb, there exists a 
set of g4(H)  É G4, including linear strategy ga(H),  which support different 
stable stationary points,  H*.  From the hyperbolic property of g4(H),  one 
can see that there exists one solution curve and one stable stationary point 
H*(Ho) such that H*(Ho) < HH  < Ho  and g4(H)  intersects SSL at H*(Ho) 
and Ho, so that H*(Ho)  defines  an upper bound for  the stable stationary 
points which can be reached from the initial value, HO.19  On the other hand, 
the lowest  stable stationary point which  can  be supported as a  stationary 
Markov  feedback  equilibrium from  Ho  is  given  by the intersection of the 
linear strategy, ga(H), with SSL.  Thus, the reachable stable stationary point 
set for  Ho,  E(Ho) , is  given  by the Ho  - dependent interval  [Ha, H*(Ho)). 
These results are summarized in the next proposition. 
Proposition 6  (a) E(Hh) e E(Ho)  fo1'  any Ho, Hh  su  eh  that H~o < Ho  < 
Hh  < Hb•  (b)  E(Ho) -+ [Ha, H*(Hso)),  as Ho -t Hso' 
(a)  shows  that for  two  different  initial water tables  Hu  and  Hh  with 
Ho  < Hb  the stable stationary point set reachable from  Hb  is smaller than 
the one from  Ho, and (b)  implies that the highest stable stationary water 
table that can be supported by a stationary Markov strategy is lower than 
19Notice that the solution curve that defines the point H'(Ho) cannot be llsed to reach 
that pOÍllt becallse it cuts the SSL at Ho. 
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HH  since H~o  is higher than HH  and consequently H*(Hso) is on the left of 
HH  (see Fig.  3).  This comparison allows us to conclude that the open-loop 
Nash equilibrium water table is  higher than the highest stationary water 
table that can be reached as a  staUonary Markov feedback  equilibrium from 
Ho  > Hso since Hso =  H~L' In other words, although the stationary water 
table H*  remains indeterminate, this result establishes that the strategic ex-
ternality that arises from the competition among farmers to capture ground-
water reserves exacerbates the overexploitation of the aquifer compared to 
the open-loop solution.2oFinally, we want to point out that another corollary 
of this proposition is that the linear stationary Markov feedback equilibrium 
is global; that is, it can be reached from any initial value; whereas the nonlin-
cal' stationary Markov strategies can only be used when the initial value of 
the state variable is lower than the upper bound defined by H b• However, in 
that case, non  linear strategies support a stationary water table that is closer 
to the open-loop Nash equilibrium water table than the stationary water ta-
ble supported by the linear strategy, and consequently closer to the socially 
optimal solution. 
Now  if we  want to evaluate the impact of the strategic externality on 
the stationary value of the water table it seems necessary to investigate if it 
is  possible to resolve the indetermination of the stationary Markov feedback 
20Notice that independently of which  is  the initial  value,  Ho,  always  provided that 
Ha <Ho, wehavethatH*(Ho) < H'(Hso) < HH =  HOL , (seeFig. 3), andconsequently 
the stationary water table for the feedback sollltion has to be lower than the one fOl'  the 
open-Ioop solution since H* (Ho)  is the upper extreme of E(Ho). 
31 equilibrium.  The way to do that is to study if a positive relationship between 
the stationary water table level and the payoff of the game can be established, 
because if that kind of relationship exists, then we could conclude that the 
stationary equilibrium water table is that which generates the highest payoff. 
For this point; we have the following proposition. 
Proposition 7  For a given Ho  such that Hso < Ho < Hb  there  exists more 
than one stationary Markov feedback  equilibri1lm,  E(Ho) e  [Ha, H*(Hso )): 
Then the equilibTium which supports the highest stationary water table gen-
erates  the  highest payoff of the game that starts  at Ho.  Thus  the payoff of 
a stationary Markov feedback  equilibrium increases with the level of its sup-
porting water tableo 
Proo.f.  See Appendix. 
This result implies that for  a given initial value the steady-state equilib-
rium water table is the highest value of the Ho-dependent interval E(Ho). 
Notice that as the interval is open on the right, H*(Ho)  is actually the lowest 
upper bound of the stationary point.  Moreover,  this result also establishes 
that the linear stl'ategy, ga(H), generates the lowest payoff of the game that 
starts at Ho.  This implies that, in spite of linear stl'ategy being global, when 
Ho  < Hb it is  dominated by the nonlinear strategies, since these generate a 
higher payoff.  In that case using linear strategies to compute the feedback 
solution will lead to an overestimation of the overexploitation of the aquifer 
caused by the strategic behavior of the agents. 
32 
Returning now  to the discussion  of the evaluation of the strategic ex-
ternality effect on the stationaJ.'y value of the water table, we find that the 
comparison between the two solutions is  not feasible,  at least for  the non-
linear strategies, since these are not defined in an explicit way (see equation 
(21)).  However,  it is  very easy to find an upper bound for  this effect  using 
HL 






ASNr2  < O 
R 
ASrN2 < O. 
These results are summarized in the last proposition. 
(33) 
Proposition 8  (i)  The  stationary  open-loop  Nash  equilibrium water'  table 
is higher than the  highest stationary water' table  that can  be  suppoTted  by  a 
stationary Markov strategy.  (ii)  The impact of the strategic  externality on 
the stationary value of the water table presents an 1lpper bound given by  the 
difference  between the stationary water table for the open-loop  solution and 
the stationary water table for the myopic solution,  this difference declines  as 
the discount rate and/or the number of farmers increases. 
This result confirms Negri's conclusion:  the competition among users fol' 
the appropriation of a finite common property resource increases the overex-
ploitation of the aquifer, compared to the open-loop solution.  On the othel' 
hand,  the effect  of the discount rate variation is  explained by the different 
33 impacts that the variations of discount rate have on HMy  and Hl JL•  Thus, 
an increase in the discount rate decreases the user cost for the open-loop so-
lution, but does not have any effect on HMy  since this value is independent 
of the discount rateo  Moreover, the effect that a variation in the number of 
farmers has ori difference (33) is clear if one no  tices that HMy is also indepen-
dent of N. Then an increase in N  reduces the user cost of the resource and 
the stationary open-Ioop Nash equilibrium water table, causing a decrease i~ 
the difference between Hcn and HMy. 
FinaHy, we can define using (15), the effect of cost externality, and (33), 
the effect of strategic externality, an upper bound for the dynamic inefficiency 
associated wíth the private exploitation of groundwater 
(34) 
This result is consistent with Gisser and Sánchez rule.  Thus, we can conclude 
that the difference between the socially optimal exploitation and the prívate 
exploitation of groundwater, characterized by a stationary Markov feedback 
equilibrium,  decreases with the storage capacity of the aquifer and if this 
is  large enough the two equilibria are identícal for  aH  practical purposes. 
In fact,  when we  add the two  differences  (15)  and (33)  we  get  the same 
expression as the one deríved by Gisser and Sánchez.21  Obviously, this result 
limits the practical scope of Negri's result, so that the consideration of the 
21This happens because the upper bound for the strategic externality is defined resorting 
to the myopic solution.  However, it must not be forgotten that this difference is an upper 
bound of the difference between the optimal and prívate solutions and therefore represents 
an overestimation of the overexploitation of the aquifer. 
34 
strategic externality does not significantly increase the inefficíency of prívate 
exploitation. 
6  An empirical illustration 
Usíng data from  Gisser and Sánchez (1980)  corresponding to Pecos Basin, 
New Mexico and Níeswiadomy (1985) correspondíng to the Texas High Plaíns 
we  have computed the different equilibria studied in this paper:  the opti-
mal exploitation, the open-Ioop Nash equilibrium and the stationary Markov 
feedback equilibrium in linear strategies.  The results obtained allow us to 
compare the different regimens in  terms of steady state values of the water 
table as weH as in terms of present values. 
These results establish that the relationship found in Prop.  7 between 
the payoff of the game and the stationary water table level for the stationary 
Markov feedback equilibria is also verified when  we compare the different 
equilibria.  Thus, we observe that the equilibrium with the highest stationary 
water table always generates the highest payoff of the game.  This allows us 
to extend the first part of Prop. 8 to the present values associated with each 
equilibrium, and conclude that the payoff generated by the open-Ioop Nash 
equilibrium is higher than the highest present value that can be generated by 
a stationary Markov strategy.  Obviously, the present value associated with 
the optimal exploitation will be the highest payoff of the game. 
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TABLE 11:  IDGH PLAINS 
Cost externality: difference between the optimal depletion and the open-loop Nash equilibrium. 
Strategic externality: difference between the open-Ioop Nash equilibrium and the stationary Markov feedback 
equilibrium in linear strategies. 
37 TABLE III: PECOS BASIN 
Cost externality: difference between the optimal  and the open-loop Nash equilibrium. 
Strategic externality: difference between the open-loop Nash equilibrium and the stationary Markov feedback 
equilibrium in linear strategies. 
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In Tables II and III we have represented the impact of the cost and strate-
gic externalities on the stationary water table and present values for  three 
different values of the number of farmers and the rate of discount.  The cost 
externality has been  calculated as  the difference  between  the optimal ex-
ploitation and the open-loop Nash equilibrium, and the strategic externality 
as the difference between the open-loop Nash equilibrium and the stationary 
Markov feedback equilibrium in linear strategies. The use of linear strategies 
is  justified in this last case because we have checked that the initial value 
for  the water table is  higher than the value defined by the intersection of 
the unstable linear strategy and the steady state line and in that case, as we 
have pointed out at the beginning of Section 5 (see Fig. 3), the only strategy 
that leads to a stable stationary point is the linear one with positive slope. 
The results show that the cost externality decreases as the discount rate 
increases and increases as the number of farmers pumping water from the 
aquifer increases, whereas the strategic externality also decreases as the rate 
of discount increases but decreases as the number of farmers increases. 
The largest cost externality corresponds to the largest number of farmers 
and the lowest rate of discount (0.02).  This externality amounts to 27.747 
feet for water table elevation and $14,321,384 for the present value at Texas 
High Plains,  and 63.976  feet  and $1,316,431  dollars at Pecos  Basin,  New 
Mexico.  The largest strategic externalíty corresponds to the lowest number 
of farmers and the lowest rate of discount.  This externality amounts to 0.139 
feet and $143,616 at High Plains and 0.213 feet and $7,760 at Pecos Basin. 
39 Therefore,  the cost externality is  greater than the strategic externality for 
the two cases, so that the largest total externality corresponds to the largest 
number of farmers and the lowest rate of discount for both percentages and 
levels.  Total externalities reduce by  27.756  feet,  0.872  in  percentage, the 
water table elevation at the steady state and $14,331)42,4.041 in percentage, 
the present value with respect to the optimal exploitation at High Plainsj and 
by 63.991 feet, 4.025 in percentage, the water table elevation and $1,317,071 
dollars, 0.087 in percentage, the present value at Pecos Basin. 
The results  indicate that  the benefits  from  groundwater  management 
most  likely  are small,  especially relative to any reasonable  costs of regu-
lating pumping.  For example, for  a discount rate of 2%,  it would only take 
an annual regulating cost higher than $286,623 per year at High Plains and 
$26,341 per year at Pecos Basin to make the present value of the costs exceed 
the present value of the benefits coming from regulation. 
7  Conclusions 
In this papel' we  have developed the model defined by Gisser and Sánchez 
(1980)  to study the effects  of strategic behavior on  the efficiency  of pri-
vate groundwater exploitation.  We have followed  Negri's (1989)  approach 
and have evaluated the impact of the strategic externality as  the difference 
between the open-loop and feedback solutions.  In particular, we have inves-
tigated if the Gisser and Sánchez rule still works when it is  assumed that 
agents are rational and the strategic externality is  taken into account.  To 
40 
compute the feedback equilibria we have used non  linear strategies following 
Tsutsui and Mino's (1990)  procedure. 
Our results show that strategic behavior, which arises from the compe-
tition among firrns  to capture the groundwater reserves,  increases the in-
efficiency of private exploitation with respect to the open-loop equilibriurn 
which captures only the pumping cost externality.  However, they also show 
that the difference between the socially optimal exploitation and the private 
exploitation of the aquifer, represented by a feedback equilibrium, decreases 
with the storage capacity of the aquifer,  and thus if this is  relatively large 
the two equilibria are identical for  aH  practical purposes.  A corollary of this 
result  is  that the potential benefits  associated with the regulation of the 
resource are relatively small. 
Finally, we would like to present sorne remarks about the scope of this last 
conclusion.  Fírst, as Worthington, Burt and Brustkern (1985)  have pointed 
out in  an empírical work using data from a confined aquifer underlying the 
Crow Creek Valley, Montana, it can happen that the difference between the 
two regimens is not trivial if the relationship between average extraction cost 
and the water table level is not linear and there exist significant differences 
in land productivity.  ConsequenUy,  we  think that further research is  nec-
essary in at least two directions before taking a position against regulation 
of the resource.  One would be to undertake more empirical work to test 
the hypothesis of linearity, and the other to develop more theoretical work 
to resolve an asymrnetric groundwater purnping differential game where the 
41 differences in land productivity were taken into account.  1'0 complete the 
analysis, the cornparison between the two regirnes would have to be carried 
out, also assurning uncertainty about recharge 01'  surface water supply.22 
Moreover, we also think that using only the firrns'  profits to characterize 
the socially 0ptirnal exploitation is  problernatic when there exists the possi-
bility of irreversible events 01' irreparable darnage to nature. In that case, the 
water rnanagernent authority would have to incorporate the water table level 
into its objective function and postulate sorne kind of intervention to avoíd 
'extinction' 01'  the occurrence of irreversible events.23  1'his could be another 
subject for future research. 
Another situation that could require sorne kind of regulation rnay present 
itself when groundwater is also used for urban consurnption. In that case the 
water pollution caused by the use of chernical products in agricultural activity 
alters the quality of water and affects negatively the welfare of urban con-
surners, generating another externality that would in  crease the inefficiency 
of private exploítation of groundwater. 
22 As far as we know only I<napp and Olson (1995)  have addressed this issue, and they 
have found that when  surface water supply is  uncertain the benefits from  groundwater 
management continue to be relatively small. 
23See Tsur and Zemel (1995)  fol'  the study of the optimal exploitation of groundwater 
when extraction affects the probability of occurrence of an irreversible evento 
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A  Proof of Proposition 5 
Since  (32)  is  obtained  by  substitution  of the necessary  condition for  the 
rnaxirnization of the right-hand side of Bellrnan equation, V' = 
A8/b-1) ((g/k) +- Co  +- c1H - (Nw(H)/k)) in the Bellrnan equation, J(H) 
íB  a value function that generates stationary Markov strategies such as the 
ones defined byequatíon (21).  By its construction, it is clear that J(H)  is 
twice differentiable. 
Now for each H*  E (Ih, HH),  we have to show that J(H) is nonnegative 
on B(H*). 
Except for Ha, we have that all the solution curves on B(H*) are bounded 
by 
o  S g(H) S rnin [gL(H),w(H) defined by dw/dH =  -00, l(H)]  (35) 
for each H*  E (HL,HH),  as one can see frorn  the Fig.  2.24  Define 
N(2N-1)  2  (  (g  )  h(w, H)  =  - 2k  w  +- (N - 1)  k +  Ca  +- c1H 
-k(~~l))w+- 'Y~1 (~+-CO+-CIH). 
Note that rJ(H)  =  h(g(H), H).  Let  us consider the area surrounded by 
w =  O,  w = gL(H), 
w = (2N ~  l)N [(N -1) (~+- Co  +- CIH)  - k(~~  1)]  (36) 
24We suppress the superscript n  of the solution curves fol'  notational simplicity when 
no confusion arises 01' the argument is independent of n. 
43 defined by dw / dH =  -00 and 
b  k(N - 1)  (g)  R  G  b 
9  (H) = N(2N _ 1)  k +  Ca  - (ry - 1)(2N -1) + F Y 
+ [
k(N - 1)Cl +  b]  H  (37) 
N(2N -1)  Y  . 
The intersecÚon between w = O and w = gL(H)  is  (~L, O);  the intersection 
between w =  gL(H) and (36) is (HL, -R/N(ry-1)); the intersection between 
(36)  and (37)  is  (H,w);  finally  the intersection between  (37)  and SSL  is 
(H b, -R/N(ry-1)). It is easy to see that XL<  HL < H < H
b
• It is important 
that except for w = ga(H), w = g(H) defined on B(H*) is  contained in this 
area.  Thus,  if we  can show h(w, H)  2::  O in  this  area,  the proof will be 
completed for H* =  Ha. 
(i) We represent the function given by h(w, H)  = O in the H  w planeo 
The function H(w)  defined by  condition h(w, H)  =  O has two extremes 
at the points: 
and 
H'  1 
w'  1 
H'  2 
w~  = 
NR((2N -1)! - N)  _  ~  (fL + co) 
clk(ry -1)(N -1)2  Cl  k 
(38) 
R(1- (2N - 1t~) 
(ry - l)(N - 1) 
(39) 
NR((2N - 1)~ + N)  1  (g  ) 
- clk(ry - 1)(N - 1)2  - Cl  k +  Co  (40) 
R(1 + (2N -1t~) 
(ry - 1)(N - 1) 
(41) 
(HL wD  being a local maximum and  (H~,  w~) a local minimum.  Moreover, 
the function presents a  discontinuity point at w = -R/(ry - 1)(N - 1), so 
44 
that 
lim  H(w) = -00, 
w->  (-y  1)1N  1) 
(42) 
and is concave on the right of this discontinuity point and cop.vex on the left. 
For w  =  O,  H  is -1/Cl((g/k) + ca)  which is the sarue value defined by the 
functíon V' = O for w = O. It is also easy to check that (H~, wD  and (H~,  w~) 
satisfy equation (36)  and H~ < HL  and H < H~. 
On the other hand, for the function h( w, H) we have 
-=Cl (N-1)w+-- ,  dh  (  R  ) 
dH  "(-1 
(43) 
and in that case 
R  (44) 
(ry - l)(N - 1) 
and then we can determine the areas where h(w, H)is positive.  These results 
are represented in the Fig.  4 
45 v'=O 
w 
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(ii)  Now  we show that l(H) is  a  hyperplane which separates the two 
h < O sets:  in othel' wol'ds, the linear strategy is  contained in the area with 
h > O of the H  - w planeo 
Using l(H) and the quadl'atic equatíon fol' y that appears in the deriva-
tion of equation (21), the h(w, H) function can be wrítten as 
h( b(H)  H)  N ASr  (kCl  b) H2 
9  ,  =  2k (')' - 1)  2N - 1 - Y 
N ASr  [G  b  k  (g  ) 
k(')'-l)  F Y  - 2N-1  k+ co 
R  ]  k(N - 1)2  (g  )2 
- (2N - 1)(')' -1)  H + 2N(2N - 1)  k +  Co 
RN  (g)  NR
2 
+  (')' - 1)(2N - 1)  k +  Co  + 2k(ry -1)2(2N - 1) 
_  N(2~-1)  (~)  2 (yb)2.  (45) 
The mínimum of this functíon is gíven by 
( 
kCl  b)  1Gb  k  (g)  R 
2N -1 - Y  H  =  FY  - 2N - 1  k +  Co  - (2N - 1)(')' -1)' 
It is easy to show that for H' the V' = O and gh(H) functions intersect, so we 
can conclude that V' = O when function  (45)  l'eaches its mínimum.  If  now 
we rewrite function (45)  in terms of V' we get 
_ k(2N - 1)(')' -1)2  (V')2 
2N(AS)2 
[ 
R  k(')' - 1)  (g  )]  I  +  AS +  AS  k +  Co + c1H  V 
k  (g  )2 
- 2N  k +  Co + c1H  , 
which at its mínimum takes the value 
( b(  ')  ')  k  (g  1)2  h 9  H  ,H  = - 2N  k +  Co +  c1H  ~  O. 
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(46) 
(47) Moreover, as gb(H) intersects the line V' =  o  on the left of the line dw/dH = 
o  and aboye the line -R/(,-1)(N-1) (see Fig.  4), we have that h(gb(H'), H') 
is strictly positive. 
AH  this shows,  as can be seen in Fig.  4,  that w = g(H)  defined by (35) 
on B(H*) gives a positive value for h(w, H). 
(iii) If H*  =  Ha,  ga(H)  is defined by B(Ha)  =  [~a, Hm).  As before, we 
can show 
N ASr  (kCl  a) H 2 
2k(cy - 1)  2N - 1 - Y 
N ASr  [G  a  k  (g  ) 
- k(cy - 1)  pY  - 2N - 1  k +  Co 
R  ]  k(N _1)2  (g  )2 
(2N - 1) (cy - 1)  H + 2N  (2N - 1)  k +  Co 
RN  (g)  NR
2 
+ (cy - 1)(2N - 1)  k + Co  + 2k(cy - 1)2(2N - 1) 
_ N(2~k  - 1)  (~)  2 (ya)2 
k  (g  )2  >  - 2N  k +  Co + c1H'  ;:::  O.  (48) 
Notice that if h(ga(H'), H')  =  O,  then the linear strategy would have to be 
tangent to h( w, H)  =  O at H' and would intersect  the V' =  O lirie  from 
ab  ove ,  but as ga(H)  passes through  (fI,11;),  which  is  on  the right  of the 
V' = O line, the linear strategy cuts the V' = O line from below, what means 
that h(ga(H'), H') is strictly positive at its minimum.  Furthermore, it is easy 
to confirm using (24)  that function (48)  is  convexo 
These three steps complete the proof.  Q.E.D. 
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B  Proof of Proposition 7 
Suppose that H*, H*'  E E(Ho).  Let g(H) and g'(H)  be the solution curves 
that support H*  and H*'  respectively, and let J(H) and J'(H) be the corre-
sponding value functions.  From Proposition 5,  we have 
rJ(Ho)  =  - N(2~  -1)  g(HO )2 + [(N -1) (* + Ca + CIHo) 
- k(~~  1)] g(Ho) + , ~  1  (* + Co + cIHo) , 
rJ'(Ho)  N(2~  - 1) g'(HO)2 + [(N - 1) (* + Co + CIHo) 
NR  ]  ,  R  (g  )  k(,-l)  g(Ho)+ ,-1  k+CO+CIHo  . 
The difference rJ'(Ho) - rJ(Ho) can be written as 
Without loss of generality, we assume H*  < H*'.  Then g'(Ho)  < g(Ho) from 
the property of the resolution curves.  For g(H)  =1=  ga(H)  we  know from 
demonstration of Proposition 5 that g'(Ho)  and g(Ho)  are lower than (36): 
the linear  function  defined  by the condition:  dw/dH  =  -00,  and thus 
rJ'(Ho) - rJ(Ho) is  positive.  Suppose now that g(H)  = ga(H).  Then as 
49 g'(Ho) < l(Ho) we have 
substituting ga(Ho) and l(Ho) using (25) and (26)  yields 
where ya + yb  is  negative.  The sign  of G j F  + Ho  depends on  the slope 
of the linear function defined by dw j  dH = O.  If  this is negative, then iI < 
HH  <  Hso  <  Ho, and therefore Gj  F  + Ho  is  positive.  If instead it  is 
positive, HH  < iI, and G j F  +  Ho  remains undetermined.  If we assume that 
GjF +Ho ~  O,  then G ~ -FHso,  substituting (23), (22) and (14)  fol' G,F 
and Hso l'espectively we obtain 
O~ 
which is a contradiction since the right-hand side of the inequality is negative. 
So  we  have that GjF +Ho  is  positive and thel'efol'e  (ya + yb)(GjF  + Ho) 
is negative, l'esulting in a positive value fol'  the difference rJ'(Ho) - rJ(Ho). 
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